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Abstract
Mainstream economic theories of rent-seeking and interest groups typically ignore the parallel,
yet highly relevant, streams of research on social networks and groups. Incorporating these
broader social and psychological theories into economic models of rent-seeking appear to be
a promising avenue for developing an integrated theory of the market for political influence
that predicts many of the observed stylised facts, and can better inform policy makers. Such
a theory has the potential to predict the often conflicting findings of empirical studies - such
as significant underinvestment in rent-seeking, loyalty of political donors and recipients, and
the variation in the prevalence of the ‘revolving door’ across industries.
This review highlights the shortcomings of basic rent-seeking theory and analyses how network
and group concepts can improve the alignment between theory and evidence. Directions in
research and policy analysis based on an integrated model are discussed.
1 Is political influence for sale?
Economists generally answer with a resounding ‘yes’. Since Tullock (1967) and Krueger’s (1974)
pioneering articles, the idea that there is a market for political influence that generates a cost to
society has been well established in the economic literature.
But economists are just a small subset of the social scientists seeking to understand the nature of
political influence. The two other major areas of research are in sociology and psychology.
In sociology, the idea of social networks provides an important framework for analysing relation-
ships between politicians, industry groups, lobbyists, and other personal and professional contacts.
While social psychologists understand that in-group favouritism generates social behaviour that
contradicts basic economic assumptions of individual rationality. Sociologists and psychologists
would not so easily profess that political influence is for sale, let alone operating in a competitive
market with specific prices reflecting the marginal benefits and marginal costs at which political
decisions can be bought.
This review identifies the limitations of the economic approach, seeking to understand how alter-
native approaches may be synthesised into a rigorous framework to better understand the costs
and benefits arising from the operation of this market. An exhaustive review of the literature is
unnecessary, and this paper is not intended to fulfil this purpose. Su cient coverage of relevant
concepts demonstrate the benefits of core principles from each field to an integrated approach.
Recent research blending these approaches is briefly examined.
Additionally Appendix A provides a dictionary of terms used in to describe activities that take
place in the market for political influence.
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2 A perfect market vision
In political science, pluralism captures the idea of multiple group interests competing to influence
political decisions. This ancient past-time has been extensively studied in political science, but it
was not until 1965 that these principle were proposed in economic terms by Mancur Olson (1965),
and then in an economic journal by Tullock (1967), and again independently by Krueger (1974).
It took a decade before economists generally focussed their minds on this problem, and the 1980s
saw a boom in theorising about political markets in economics terms, becoming an independent
field of study under the banner of ‘Public Choice Theory’.
As Mitchell and Munger (1991) note, by the time of their writing economists had been extensively
theorising about pluralism under ‘such arcane terminology as “rent-seeking”, “life among the
triangles and trapezoids”,“DUP, or directly unproductive profit-seeking”, and “optimal tari↵s
with revenue-seeking”.’ Since rent-seeking models adopt primitives consistent with pluralism,
these areas are considered together.
What are these primitives? They consist of self-interested and perfectly informed individu-
als, known established interest groups, and government acting as an allocator of rents, while
”[p]oliticians and bureaucrats are assumed to carry out the political allocations resulting from
the competition among pressure groups.” (Becker, 1983). The competitive market stems from the
observation that “[i]n all societies virtually an unlimited number of pressure groups could form to
lobby for political aid to their members.” (Becker, 1983).
Tollison (1998) describes the fundamental theory as follows:
Government activities are viewed as a process in which wealth or utility is redis-
tributed among individuals and groups. Some individuals and groups are e↵ective at
organizing and engaging in collective action such that they are able, for example, to
organize for less than a $1 in order to procure $1 of wealth transfers. These individuals
and groups are net demanders of transfers. Other individuals and groups are in the
inverse position – it costs them more than a $1 to avoid giving up a $1. Rational behav-
ior dictates that this second group of individuals will be net “suppliers” of transfers.
The institutional framework of representative democracy and its agents represent the
means of facilitating wealth transfers, that is, of pairing demanders and “suppliers”
e ciently. There exists an equilibrium level of transfers in this theory, with deviations
being mitigated through elections.
Under the banner of rent-seeking, economists have considered the market for political influence to
operate much like a lottery or tournament (to take just one recent example, Alcalde and Dahm
(2010)). Full rent dissipation, or the expenditure equal to the value of Tullock’s rectangle in
Figure 1 is generally the predicted equilibrium outcome. While many variations of rent-seeking
games exist with lower predicted rent-seeking expenditure (such as Menezes and Quiggin (2010)),
it would be di cult to find any that account for the observed empirical evidence of such minimal
expenditure on lobbying or political donations.
Economic theory does provide a framework for determining welfare costs arising in the market for
political influence. In the market model, favourable policy in the form of monopoly power enables
a reduction of output and an increase in price compared to the competitive market outcome.
In Figure 1 we see the downward sloping demand curve, with the competitive market price and
quantity, C and Q, and the monopoly price and quantity, MP and QM. If a government decision
involves the possibility of creating such a monopoly through regulatory restrictions, the winners
from this regulation would rationally invest in rent-seeking activities up to a cost represented
by a portion of the whole rectangle between the MP and C lines, or Tullock’s rectangle. If the
market for rents in competitive, a value equal to the whole rectangle will be wasted on rent-seeking
activities.
Total welfare costs come in two forms: Tullock’s rectangle, or losses arising from resources diverted
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Figure 1: Tullock’s rectangle and Harberger’s triangle Tullock (1997)
from productive activities to rent-seeking activities, rent-seeking costs, and the e ciency loss aris-
ing from constricting the production frontier and growth prospects through sub-optimal allocation
and regulation that results from rent-seeking, or growth costs 1. Theories of rent-seeking have little
to say about growth costs, which were first explored in detail by Murphy et al. (1993). Indeed,
rent-seeking theories do not predict any particular relationship between the size of rent-allocations
(the shift from Q to QM in Figure 1), the scale of rent-seeking costs, and size of growth costs, even
if intuitively they may be related in some circumstances but not others. For example, it is possible
that easily persuaded politicians would provide large rents for low rent-seeking costs, which may
have relatively low growth costs.
3 Puzzling deviations from the market
Theoretical developments in rent-seeking have failed miserably in any predictive capacity. The
empirical evidence against these basic models is extensive.
3.1 A free lunch?
Tullock (1997) laments that the actual rent-seeking costs appear much lower when one actually
tries to measure them. He states “We now have various statistic on lobbying activities, etc. They
are not complete, but they show actual expenditures which are trivial compared to the size of
the gain.” In a recent survey of the empirical literature, Del Rosal (2011) finds estimates of
rent-seeking costs are often zero, and methodological problems plague the much higher estimates.
1The static representation of this e ciency loss is the ‘Harberger’ triangle in Figure 1 formed by the lines MP,
QM and D. However the possibly larger long run costs in terms of reduced growth are not captured in the static
model.
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Theoretical developments treating rent-seeking as a deterministic contest show that the increasing
asymmetry of information among contestants for rents reduces competition and rent-seeking costs
(Kirkegaard). Yet this assumption requires further explanation. What mechanism sustains this
information imbalance? Why doesn’t a market for information emerge given the enormous returns
available?
Others argue that uncertainty and risk-aversion explain low rent-seeking costs (Treich, 2010). If
outcomes are uncertain, risk-averse agents will fail to invest an optimal amount in rent-seeking
activities. This explanation relies on a finite number of risk-taking agents, and relies on information
failures. If risk-averse agents know others are underinvesting, this increases their certainty of a
pay-o↵. A better explanation is needed.
3.2 Where is the bribery and extortion?
Bribery is rare in countries with e↵ective monitoring and policing. Indeed, if one subscribes to
rent-seeking theory, bribery appears the cheapest mode of influence, and the lowest cost to society,
as it diverts no resources to rent-seeking activities. Yet rent-seeking theory tells us little about
the method of political influence. Are politicians persuaded through sheer volume of contact with
lobbyists, their arguments and industry specific information? Some research suggests that lobbying
through information provision works only under conditions where preferences of politicians and
interest already mostly align, and indeed it is not the information itself that is persuasive, but the
signal it creates (Potters and Winden, 1992).
Additionally, politicians in developed countries don’t appear to extort companies that benefit
from new policies. If companies were not bribing politicians for the rents they receive from new
policies, the rational response is for politicians extort payments from them to not introducing costly
regulation. Cynical economists may believe this happens behind closed doors. Alternatively,
donations and revolving doors between politics and the private sector could be a form of soft
bribery of politicians who are cheap because they can’t coordinate there own interests against the
pressure groups.
3.3 Entrenched loyalty
Political donors are loyal to politicians who are likely to pass regulation in their favour. Swing
politicians receive few donations and are not targeted by lobbysits (Bertrand et al., 2011; Koger
and Victor, 2009; Harrigan, 2008). This is the opposite of what rent-seeking theory predicts. Why
preach to the choir?
3.4 Equality of access to the market
Not every interest group lobbies on every policy proposal, yet every group is usually a↵ected by
large scale reallocation of rents. The theoretical reason is that the marginal costs for coordinat-
ing and monitoring free-riders is higher for dispersed groups (Becker, 1983). This is a common
economic coordination problem, but it simply leads to the question of why some groups’ coordina-
tion costs are higher? How can the labor movement have coordinated so well historically against
smaller and more well-connected business interests?
In its basic form, rent-seeking theories say nothing about equality of rent distributions resulting
from rent-seeking markets. Only recently has Shughart II et al. (2003) expanded the competitive
market picture of rent-seeking by showing demonstrating a long-term inverse relationship be the
Gini coe cient and interest group dominance in US states. If successful rent-seeking leads to
greater inequality, one needs to consider that increasing inequality further improves that bargaining
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position of selected interest groups, bringing into question the assumptions of competitive markets
for interest groups. Maybe winning rent-seekers increase their chances at winning future decisions.
3.5 Super-optimal markets
Though rent-seeking theory assumes a market for political favour operating optimally, the eco-
nomic profession has been focussed on the welfare costs of this market. Which is surprising and
confusing at the same time. The baseline welfare calculation would involve perfect and complete
markets, even for political influence. In this case, any costs below the full Tullock rectangle would
be super-optimal. Moreover, the resulting output costs would be zero, because society would
politically trade favours towards the frontier.
For example, if information asymmetry is a market failure that means rent dissipation is low, the
economic solution would be to address the market failure by improving information. In the market
for political influence, this would increase rent-seeking costs and result in welfare loss for society as
whole. Exactly which baseline the welfare costs and benefits of the market for political influence
can be compared is unresolved.
4 Social networks
Networks are an important but neglected avenue for the study of markets by economists, and are
a critical element in the covert market for political influence. The weight of evidence on lobbying,
donations and favouritism of social connections shows social ties to be important determinants
of political influence (Grossmann and Dominguez, 2009; Koger and Victor, 2009; Bertrand et al.,
2011). The significance of the embeddedness of economic relations within social structures boils
down to four core principles that govern how social networks a↵ect economic outcomes (Granovet-
ter, 2005).
1. Norms and network density
2. The strength of weak ties
3. The importance of structural holes
4. The interpenetration of economic and non-economic man.
The relationship between network density and the transmission and enforcement of social norms
can complement iInterest group models by expanding on the assumptions about the costs of coor-
dinated collective action. Denser social networks provide the means of monitoring and promoting
cooperation and establishing trust. As Granovetter (2005) explains, “overcoming free-rider prob-
lems is more likely in groups whose social network is dense and cohesive, since actors in such
networks typically internalize norms that discourage free riding and emphasize trust.”
The principle of weak ties proposes that individuals, whose close friends2 in a network do not
share many of the same friends, benefit from indirect (two links removed) weak ties to a larger
proportion of the population. Individuals with extensive weak ties receive information flows from
a wider variety of sources through their friendship network. This principle is embedded in the
notion of structural holes, a more general term to describe the centrality of individuals in a social
network as a proportion of the number of shortest paths connecting all nodes going through them.
Individuals or firms bridging structure holes benefit from loyalties, norms, trust and information
flows from multiple dense parts of the complete social network. For an entrepreneur, such broad
2The terms friends is used as a generic word to describe acquaintances, whether they be family, personal or
collegial relationships
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connections are valuable. Many sociologists even define entrepreneurial activity as the act of
bridging structural holes.
If lobbyists and interest groups can pursue a social position providing access to politicians from
multiple parties they may gain an advantage. Is there evidence of entrepreneurs in the market for
political influence seeking to target both sides of politics to overcome their information asymmetry?
Maybe. But the evidence throws up other important considerations.
For example, Koger and Victor (2009) analyse patterns of lobbying and donation behaviour in the
US, finding that -
...lobbyists tend to concentrate their attention on political allies, avoid their ideo-
logical adversaries, and infrequently lobby fence-sitters, suggesting that they are not
buying votes or persuading legislators on a case-by-case basis.
More importantly, lobbyists appear to systematically switch issues as the politicians
they were previously connected to switch committee assignments, hence following peo-
ple they know rather than sticking to issues. We also find evidence that lobbyists that
have issue expertise earn a premium, but we uncover that such a premium for lobbyists
that have connections to many politicians and Members of Congress is considerably
larger.
That lobbyists with many personal connections command greater prices appears to support the
idea that a pay-o↵s exist for entrepreneurial lobbyists who manage to establish multiple political
connections. Yet these connections appear to be legislators with existing common beliefs.
More recently Bertrand et al. (2011) investigate the claim that if lobbyists are information providers,
than lobbyists with more information and experience should attain a wage premium, Moreover,
they should be able to argue both sides of an issue. Yet lobbyist are loyal to their ministerial
contacts, and usually change their issues when their contacts change committees. Both Koger and
Victor (2009) and Bertrand et al. (2011) conclude that relationships are the source of influence,
rather than expertise. Also i Vidal et al. (2011) shows that lobbyists whose US Senate connec-
tions leave o ce su↵er a 24% decline in revenue, suggesting that the value of one beneficial social
connections
Harrigan’s (2008) analysis of the network structure of Australian political donors and lobbyists
provides a more subtle story about relationship strategies. His analysis reveals two unique strate-
gies of political donors - hedging, where the donor donates to both major parties roughly equally,
or partisan, where donations are made loyally to one party, regardless of the party currently in
power. Harrigan (2008) finds that larger companies are more likely to adopt a hedging strategy for
their donations, as are members of known influential interest groups, such as the Business Council
of Australia. An earlier survey of Australian pressure groups by Abbott (1996) found that most
industry pressure groups have political contacts from more than one party.
Combining this evidence suggests that while lobbyists exploit previously established personal re-
lationships, broader industry interest groups typically adopt a hedging strategy in their donations
and lobbying activities. If the principle of weak ties is valid, then membership of industry groups
with political connection bridging party lines is a more valuable strategy, and indeed is a strategy
with potentially the highest information pay-o↵. With this framework in mind, lobbying and
political donations appear to be a tools for individual business owners to express their ideological
allegiance, or perhaps establish local relationships that will benefit their business exclusively. This
may be especially be the case for firms whose business relies on regular discretionary government
decisions, like developers who rely on planning approvals, and contractors who rely on govern-
ment spending decisions. Harrigan’s (2008) finding that directors of companies with a hedging
donation strategy often personally donate to a single political party o↵ers further support to this
observation.
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Loyalty of the non-economic man is the last key principle of social networks relevant to the market
for political influence. Granovetter (2005) makes an important connection between social loyalty
and the costs or benefits to society as a whole of non-economic activities including rent-seeking.
He writes -
The notion that people often deploy resources from outside the economy to enjoy
cost advantages in producing goods and services raises important questions, usually
sidestepped in social theory, about how the economy interacts with other social insti-
tutions. Such deployment resembles arbitrage in using resources acquired cheaply in
one setting for profit in another. As with classic arbitrage, it need not create economic
profits for any particular actor, since if all are able to make the same use of non-
economic resources, none has any cost advantage over any other. Yet overall e ciency
may be improved by reducing everyone’s costs and freeing some resources for other
uses.
Consider the instances of political connections of firm directors. Strong evidence shows that firms
with current or former politicians on their board of directors receive many benefits, such as higher
chances of government bailouts or improved chances of winning government contracts (Faccio,
2006).
That social structure can improve e ciency is important, and as mentioned earlier, the baseline
from which costs of rent-seeking are measured is not clearly defined in economic theory. It is
generally shown that loyalties and trust embedded in non-economic relationships reduces the
costs of free-riding and enhances the probabilities of collective actions Marwell et al. (1988); Choi
et al. (2011). But cronyism is the dark-side of social networks and their loyalties, and is likely
to generate growth costs when decisions favour the trust and loyalty of close ties rather than the
e ciency from better choices further distant in the network. There are well known costs from
being limited for choice by one’s social network, such as higher prices paid when buyers and sellers
deal exclusively (Vignes and Etienne, 2011). Perhaps a policy goal of providing a better-connected
national social networks that could break down class divisions and reduce crony social behaviour.
If social ties improve trust and generate political influence, it may be the case that donations are
used as signals of trust by less well-connected firms, rather than by the firms who are have a high
degree of trust from multiple social ties. Alternatively, if markets for political influence resemble
credit markets, donations and regular lobbying could be a relationship ‘fee’ or some other signal
that the credit is sound and that social convention will be followed. Perhaps the revolving door
of politicians into business is evidence of future credit pay-o↵s and be considered a rent-seeking
cost? Anthropologists have developed a picture of early markets that are run on social credit, and
the trust that religious institutions and social conventions provided (Graeber, 2011). In the covert
market for political influence, perhaps these ancient notions of markets provide a more practical
understanding.
5 In-group bias
Humans exhibit strong in-group bias (Hewstone et al., 2002). People favour others who exhibit
common traits to themselves, even without promise of future reciprocation of favouritism. Eco-
nomic theories generally ignore this type of behaviour since it is open to gaming by others. Yet
the sheer power of this psychological trait means it deserves the attention of economists, especially
in the covert market for political influence.
Connections through common groups are known to be valuable, meaning that the costs of acquiring
group loyalties are less than the benefits. For example, Fisman (2001) shows that political group
a liations and social connections of company directors in Indonesia add to company share values.
Engelberg et al. (2012) finds that when banks and firms are connected through common group
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loyalties, such as management attending the same college or previously at the same firm, credit
interest costs for firms are lower after controlling for company credit ratings. Widespread group
loyalty means that rent-seeking costs will be much lower that predicted by economic theory.
Groups can be considered as a complementary dimension of social networks. While group members
do not necessarily have established personal links, they have loyalty ties, which are important in
a market driven by trust. If one group member can signal to another their group alliances, they
are likely to gain an ‘unearned’ advantage.
Replacing group connections with ‘loyalty ties’ as in Figure 2 can further build analysis of social
networks. Individual 6, who had multiple groups memberships now gains from multiple loyalties
and an advantageous position in this new loyalty network. This provides a conceptual link between
the weak-ties and structural holes principles of networks, and the psychological underpinnings of
those positional advantages. Individual 6 has the most structural ties, and a high measure of
betweenness centrality as a result of multiple group loyalties.
Figure 2: Groups (red nodes 1-4), their members (individuals nodes 5-15), and the loyalty network
If group loyalty is valuable, gaining access to elite groups can be considered a type of rent-seeking
cost, and potentially welfare reducing. Exclusive schools, sporting and social clubs, even the costs
of courting members of wealthy families could be included in definitions of rent-seeking activities.
However, one needs to truly consider the counter-factual costs of socialising in a baseline society
where there are no group loyalties before counting them all as costs.
A developing literature on endogenous group formation also provides some clues as to the way
loyalties are formed, and is a crucial ingredient in understanding the dynamics of political influ-
ence. Recent experiments by E↵erson et al. (2008) and Fu et al. (2012) show that groups form
endogenously in repeated games, and that in-group bias can be generated by such simple group
signals as shape markers in computerised games. Further, trust-game experiments have shown
that members of groups formed through team-building activities contribute more to public good
games when playing with members of their own group, than with mixed groups (Smith, 2011).
Experiments that take a further step from endogenous group formation and in-group bias, to
include welfare costs and benefits would be useful tools for understanding the market for political
influence, and the e↵ects of policies targeted at reducing the social costs of the market.
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6 Better models of political influence
6.1 Time and trust
Like the mafia, covert ‘markets’ in political influence operate on social credit and long term trust.
One theory posits that political lobbying and donations are used to signal trust, rather than as a
means of persuasion, since they are usually o↵ered loyally to politicians and political parties who
are likely to support the interests of the donor anyway Bertrand et al. (2011). Political attendance
at industry group functions could be a trust signal in the reverse direction.
Why send signals at all if trust is generated through social ties and group loyalties? One answer
could be that politically well-connected companies do not lobby or donate, since their trust is well
established socially. Analysis of political donations and lobbyists will only capture less socially
connected firms looking to signal their group loyalties. ‘Hedging’ strategies could be appropriate
for large companies with long-term investments likely to be influenced by policies from both sides
of politics.
One might consider the revolving door from politics to business as a future payment for services,
while donations are a signal from companies benefiting from policy that their credit for these
future payments can be trusted. There is also not reason to explicitly expect that any payments
are particularly large in comparison to the rents at stake, since group loyalties ensure that the
politicians and the firms who benefits loyally play the same game.
A general model, where the likelihood of exerting political influence is proportional to trust, T ,
which itself decreases with social distance, and increases with frequency of common groups, can
be written as follows:
T =
GFi,j + di + li
SDi,j
(1)
where GF is a weighted measure of the frequency of common groups, and SD is a measure of social
distance from political decision makers, j. SD might be a measure of network position, such as the
number of paths less than a certain length between i and j. In the model, if a threshold of trust
is all that is necessary to exert influence, donations and lobbying will decline as social closeness
and common group loyalties increase. Further, if a firm is more socially distant, its lobbying and
donations must be greater to send reliable trust signals.
One might also suspect that industries relying on regular firm-level discretionary decisions by gov-
ernment, such as decision on government contractors, planning approvals for property developers
and miners, would seek to establish individual relationships rather than play the trust game ex-
clusively at an industry level. While other industries, such as with pharmacists and taxi owners,
would only need to pursue an industry-wide trust strategy.
This model of the market for political influence is surprisingly e cient from the traditional view
of rent seeking even if reallocation decisions themselves are costly for society.
6.2 Forget Tullock’s rectangle
Securing rents appears to be a relatively low cost enterprise, meaning that growth costs are the
main welfare implication of the market for political influence. Not only are the costs of Tullock’s
rectangle likely to be small, but it is not at all clear what those costs really are. If we include the
costs of seeking strategic group membership, we need to assume that in the baseline that no group
memberships would be sought, or at least in a far less costly manner. Social relationships exist
regardless of whether one attempts to choose advantageous social ties. Should the costs of private
schooling be included if one of the returns to private schooling is improved social connections?
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An alternative view is that social cohesion enables super-optimal output through reduced rent-
seeking costs and policy that facilitates broad economic growth. Thinking in this way shows that
social structure provides economic benefits, and that some social structures, that are more uni-
formly well connected, are better than others at ensuring policy decisions are made for the benefit
of the group as a whole. Estimating welfare loss from cronyism then relies on the counterfactual
of a fully connected social network.
6.3 Equality and power
Despite economic theorising with assumptions of homogenous agents of equal wealth and perfectly
contestable markets for new social links, inequality appears to be a dominant outcome of successful
rent-seeking. That access to political power is not contestable through a formal market, but via
an informal social structure, means that advantageous positions in the social network can more
cheaply coordinate not only to influence policy, but defend their positions on the network.
For example, analysis by Bihagen et al. (2012) shows that not only have class divisions increased
over recent decades in Sweden, but education as a tool for reducing equality is becoming less
beneficial over time. The entrenchment of elite groups appears to happen as a product of evolving
social structures, and it reduces pay-o↵s to education for those in less beneficial parts of the social
network.
The general rule, winners improve their chances of winning future rent allocation decisions as group
reciprocation and trust reinforces itself, such as through the revolving door. A simple model of
this process might be as follows
GFt+1 = GFt + ↵Wt    Lt , 1 > ↵ >   (2)
where W is a win and L is a loss from a rent allocation decision.
In addition to the processes at play in the social structures, a meta-game of controlling opinions of
the out-group in favour of the in-group through media and propaganda is surely a consideration.
7 Applying an integrated theory
With these general foundations in mind, policies to reduce the welfare costs of the market for
political influence can be assessed from a more informed position.
Consider Ayers and Bulow’s (1998) argument that mandating donor anonymity would disrupt
the market for political influence, since donations are identifying signals of trust in a game of
reciprocity. If we believe that signalling trust throughout donations is only required for less
connected firms, then we will simply see that market for political influence constrict to a smaller,
but better socially connected group, while rent-seeking costs may rise in the form of social ladder-
climbing.
It is also not clear whether caps on lobbying decrease rent-seeking costs (Che and Gale, 1998;
Kaplan and Wettstein, 2006; Pastine and Pastine, 2010). If professional lobbying is merely an
attempt to signal allegiance and trust, capping or outlawing it would result in a narrow field of
influence by those who have trust through fully social means. Like mandated donor anonymity,
such a move could force those who use professional lobbyists to divert resources to establishing
social connection through alternative and possibly more costly means, such as joining exclusive
social and sporting clubs.
Another policy that can be considered under a more comprehensive theory is the directive requiring
regular rotation of sta↵ in sensitive areas introduced by the German government in 1998. One
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would suspect that because relationships can’t be maintained for long term cooperation, that
in-group bias and social loyalties would have less influence on decisions by these rotated sta↵.
However, some o↵setting expenditure on making even more covert social ties with potential job
candidates from other areas of government might occur.
In an interesting use of laboratory experiments, Abbink (2004) tested this policy under the frame-
work of a repeated trust/bribery game. In this game the first mover (the firm) decides whether
or not transfer money to the second mover (the government o cial), who then accepts or rejects
the bribe, with a 0.3% chance of being ‘caught’ when accepting and having all monies taken. A
small transfer fee is taken for each o↵er regardless of it being accepted or rejected. If the bribe is
accepted, the o cial is forced to a decision between two alternatives X and Y, where X is more
beneficial to the second mover (the o cial) and Y is more beneficial to the first mover, but Y
comes at a cost to others playing similar games in parallel during the sessions, but is concealed
from the other players. Significant reductions in bribes and improvement in total welfare were
observed. These results are consistent with the notion that the trust from long-term relationships
are key factors creating political influence.
The output costs of the market for political influence can also be estimated empirically by merg-
ing data on social networks with data on firm production. Doing so also establishes a verifiable
baseline. The best analysis of this type is Cingano’s (2009) work based on connections of Italian
local politicians sitting on private company boards. He explicitly acknowledges that social con-
nections can generate welfare benefits, such as through productivity gains for the industry as a
whole by better navigating red-tape. Or they can reduce welfare through what he describes as
the grabbing hand manipulation of government contracting decisions. The results show that the
grabbing hand dominates through a 5% increase in revenue from government contracts, yet the
lack of productivity change indicates that the provision of public goods decreased by around 20%.
It is di cult to tell whether the model implicitly generates the grabbing hand e↵ect, since it relies
on controlling for productivity changes per firm over a short time (12 year) period, which are likely
to simply be a noisy, approximately mean zero, set of figures. 3. Implicitly this analysis assumes
zero rent-seeking costs, and ignores long-run growth costs from reduced provision of public goods.
However, this type of empirical work, where economic production models enable estimating of
welfare costs in terms of decreased output against a known baseline, is promising.
8 Conclusions
Including insights from network analysis and group loyalties appears to provide important clues
about how the current puzzles in the rent-seeking literature can be explained. The pure economic
approach to understanding the market for political influence fails to explain too many empirical
observations, and simply raises more questions than it answers. For example, if asymmetric
information is a reason for low rent-seeking costs what is stops the formation of a market in
information?
Integrating fundamental observations of behaviour from sociology and psychology improves the
theoretical understanding the market, and points to avenues of empirical research. Ultimately, the
market for political influence operates covertly within social structures, and by understanding the
way the social structures work will help inform better policy.
3Also, consider the scenario where a firms wins a large government contract, and subsequently undertakes a
period of capital investment to increase productive capacity. That will show up as a decline in productivity in the
short-term, yet in reality it would probably result in a long term improvement in labour productivity for that firm.
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Appendix A - Definitions
It is worth providing a dictionary of commonly used terms in the di↵erent areas of analysis of
political influence to ensure that they are used consistently.
Rent Seeking
Rent seeking is traditionally understood in economics, and now common language, is an activity
undertaken by potentially beneficiaries of government policy (those who receive rents from a policy
decision) in order to ensure policy decisions are made in a way favourable to them. The resources
devoted to these activities are usually know as the costs from rent seeking. In this review the term
rent-seeking costs has this exact meaning.
Political connections
Political connections is a term adopted to the data used by various researchers. Faccio’s (2006)
pioneering use of the term had a particular meaning.
A company is identified as being connected with a politician if at least one of its
large shareholders(anyone controlling at least 10 percent of voting shares) or one of
its top o cers (CEO, president, vice-president, chairman,or secretary) is a member of
parliament, a minister, or is closely related to a top politician or party.
Other research has adopted the term to mean connections obtained by employing former politi-
cians or their sta↵ in lobbying activities (i Vidal et al., 2011), or in studios of Chinese corporate
governance, a combination of identification with political parties and their influential institutions,
former government o cials or former experience in State institutions (Chen et al., 2011; You and
Du, 2012).
No generally accepted definition of political connections appears in the literature. However, all
uses of the term rely on the idea on the persistence of established personal relationships and
group loyalties, which are entirely consistent with the theories that position in social networks,
and membership of elite in-groups, are important determinants of political influence. This terms
will used to identify either of these types of social connection, but typically with an explanation
of whether the connection is in the form of group association, or person link in the social network.
Lobbying
Lobbying is probably the simplest idea to express. It is an act of persuasion, whether it simply
comprises provision of industry-specific information to the legislature, or whether it be more
directly a plea for industry or firm favouritism supported by propaganda and myth.
Cronyism
Begley et al. (2010) cites an anonymous blogger for definition of cronyism that captures both the
sinister and celebrated sides of the term.
Cronyism is the soft form of criminal conspiracy, but it’s also not that far removed
from the groovier, more celebrated forms of social networking. The much-vaunted
networks of Silicon Valley are a crucial form of capital, but they are also crony networks
with the attendant downsides of insider deals and quid pro quos for the connected.
mtraven (2005)
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Khatri et al. (2006: 62) defined cronyism as “a reciprocal exchange transaction where party A
shows favor to party B based on shared membership in a social network at the expense of party
Cs equal or superior claim to the valued resource.” For cronyism to exist, four conditions must be
satisfied: (1) no immediate return of favor, (2) something of value exchanged, (3) shared network
membership, and (4) at a third partys expense.
Cronyism is usually a legal activity unless specific laws prohibit relationships between decision
makers and beneficiaries.
Revolving Door
‘Revolving door’ describes the movement of individuals between roles as legislators and regulators,
and firms a↵ected by these laws and regulation. Senior Defence personnel are widely observed to
move between the role of deciding defence contracts, and tendering for them.
All but one of the Joint Chiefs of Sta↵ at the turn of the millennium ended up
serving on the board of a military contractor after completing their government service
(Etzion and Davis, 2008)
In-group bias
The well established psychological preference towards individuals (or institutions) that can be
observed to be identifiable similar. A variety of theories are put forward to explain this phenomena,
mostly focussed on expectations of common beliefs and trust between members of a common group.
Social capital
In sociology, and occasionally economics, social capital relates to ones position in a social network.
Individuals with high degrees of centrality can access a larger portion of the network through fewer
connections, and are thus exposed to more diverse information, and more importantly, are typically
receive new information sooner than others (Burt, 2000).
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